cess, 5 Tribe is as much the advocate as the academic: His central contention is that in reviewing a Supreme Court nomination the Senate must actively consider the nominee's ideology.' Given what Tribe calls the "greying" of the present Court,' and the consequent possibility that President Reagan will appoint several new justices, this is a most timely thesis. Indeed, Tribe accelerated the book's completion in large part to respond to an October 1984 speech in which Justice (now Chief Justice-designate) Rehnquist' declared that Presidents have enjoyed only "partial success" in packing the Supreme Court with justices of favorable outlook.' The Justice's remarks, Tribe feared, could well "lower the public's guard, and lessen the Senate's vigilance" when future Supreme Court nominations are made. 10 But Professor Tribe does not plead that this slender volume is a hasty piece of work. He began it long before the Rehnquist speech," and much of it, he notes, "represents . . I more years of research and of reflection about the Supreme Court and its role than I care to confess." ' 12 Given such extensive effort by so eminent a scholar, one might expect a notable contribution. The book fails to meet that expectation, and fails badly. Tribe's principal thesis is that a Senator should apply a two-part test in determining the ideological fitness of a nominee for the Supreme Court.
First, the nominee must adhere to the "American vision . . . of a just society."' In other words, some views are so extreme in our society that a Senator would justifiably regard as unfit a nominee who holds them. With that broad statement I agree, but for reasons discussed below I would define the class of acceptable views more broadly than Tribe does. In any event, there have been very few nominees who would fail even Tribe's more rigorous version of this standard; arguably, there have been none. The cutting edge of Tribe's test, then, is the second part: The nominee must not appear likely to upset the "overall balance" of the Court's ideology. In this essay, I will present in some detail reasons why I regard this standard as unworkable and improvident.
Two of the principal defects in Tribe's argument are his misleading use would have been none other than John Marshall-who might thus have been able to begin filling his exalted place in our country's history a little sooner. 20 And even if we could say in any meaningful sense that Rutledge's rejection contributed to Marshall's selection, it is difficult to discern what bearing this hypothesized fact might have on the standard that the Senate should use in reviewing Supreme Court nominations. Surely Tribe does not mean to suggest that Senators voting on Rutledge's nomination should have been prescient as to whether Rutledge or Washington's then unknown second choice would be more likely to leave the Court at just the right time to be succeeded by a visionary Chief. Nor can he mean that the Senate should confirm only nominees as "visionary" as Marshall; under that standard the Court would rarely have a single member, much less a quorum. Rather, Tribe's implication must be that the Senate's rejection of a nominee based on his substantive views, as in the case of Rutledge, 2 1 can lead to the selection of a great judge like Marshall.
And so it might. But the reader is entitled to wonder from the very start about the flip side. If the Senate exercises ideological opposition without extreme restraint, might this not more often lead in the long run to the rejection of nominees like Brandeis and Hughes-two of "this century's most esteemed Justices," according to Tribe? 2 -and to the selection of mediocrities?
It is hardly surprising that Tribe's dedication does not address this concern. What is startling is that the rest of his book ignores it-as well as much of the historical evidence that gives it weight.
line had it written an earlier line somewhat differently. Or, as Tribe puts it, "how do we forecast the past?" P. 34. Cf. 0. KHAYYAM, THE RUBAiYAT stanza 71 (E. FitzGerald trans.) (4th ed. 1879) (continuous postwriting motion of Moving Finger; incapacity of piety, wit, or tears to erase or alter such writing).
20. To play the speculative game well requires some care. Rutledge died on June 21. Ellsworth, who was in France, resigned on September 30, but Adams apparently did not receive his letter until December 15. G. HASKINS & H. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL: 1801-1815, at 103 n.158 (1981) (Volume II of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise). The political situation changed markedly between June and December; in particular, it became evident that Adams would not be reelected. Id. at 103. On the other hand, even had the vacancy occurred in June, Adams would not have been able to fill it permanently until November at the earliest; the Senate had adjourned on May 14, 10 ANNALS OF CONG.
183-84 (J. Gales ed. 1800), and did not again have a quorum until November 21, id. at 721-22.
There is thus little basis for believing that the relevant sequence of events-an offer to John Jay, Jay's declination, and then the nomination of Marshall-would have been different had it begun earlier, shortly after Rutledge's death.
21. Pp. 79-80.
P. 85.
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Vol. 95: 1283, 1986 I. FRAMEWORK On several matters I have no quarrel with Tribe. Indeed, my chief complaint about the first three chapters is not that they err but that they belabor the obvious. The principal themes of these chapters are, or at any rate should be, commonplaces in modern America: The work of the Supreme Court is crucial to the nation; even a single Justice can make a substantial difference in its results; and the substantive views of a Justice on economic, social, and political matters profoundly affect how he will perform his function. 23 We can thus take as common ground the nearly syllogistic conclusion that the ideology of a Supreme Court Justice may have a crucial impact on the nation.
This proposition, however, does not in itself indicate to what extent, if any, the Senate should consider a nominee's ideology in making its confirmation decision. In assessing this issue, we can again begin with agreement. First, Tribe is certainly correct in asserting that the Senate would not be justified in refusal to confirm a nominee to whom the Senators' only objection is that the candidate would not have been their first or even second choice. In Supreme Court appointments the Constitution allows only the President his "druthers." Allowing each Senator to confirm solely from the Senator's own "short list" would prescribe paralysis in the Supreme Court appointment process. 24 23. Perhaps Attorney General Meese disagrees with the last of these propositions, but in general it can be aptly said that "we are all realists now. 24. P. 107 (emphasis in original). In this passage, Tribe recognizes that by the nature of the appointment process, the functions of the Senate and the President cannot be the same. Given this fundamental role distinction, Tribe's characterization of the Senate as an "equal partner" in the appointment process, p. 132, has little meaning, cf. p. 93 (" [T] he Constitution gives the appointment power to the President and the Senate together, one nominates and the other confirms.") (emphasis in original). As Tribe acknowledges in another context, " [t] he appointment process requires the Senate only to react, not to create." P. 131. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 405 (A. Hamilton) (New American Library ed. 1961) (taking narrow view of Senate's role in appointment process); id. No. 66 (A. Hamilton); J. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES: THE ABA AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION 172 (1965) ("As interpreted by Hamilton, the Senate's function was not to choose judges, but rather to consent to their selection by the President.").
Neither a summary characterization such as "equal partner" nor the brief language of art. II, § 2, cl. 2 of the Constitution is of much help in determining what standards the Senate should use in performing that reactive function. In the context of political officers, whose appointments are governed by the same constitutional language, the wide discretion of the President is generally conceded. See pp. 78, 134-35. This, of course, does not compel the conclusion that the President should have the same latitude in nominating Justices; different considerations apply in the two contexts. But it does undercut, or at least render irrelevant, the argument sometimes made that the constitutional language suggests no difference between the criteria to be used by the President and those to be used by the Senate in the judicial appointment process. wrongheaded, but there seem to be a lot of folks who buy it, and I am not prepared to say that Tribe and I, but not they, are blessed with the "American vision." Indeed, I suspect that, if the bounds of the "American vision" are narrowed, the effect will be more often to keep off the Court those who, like Louis Brandeis, have views that appear radical to much of the Senate. Tribe, at least faithful to his theory in this respect, characterizes the political opposition to Brandeis as "legitimate. 3 2 But that in itself should give us pause, suggesting that Tribe's test would tend to bar the novel, radical thinker who over time might have the most to offer the Court. Suppose, for example, that the nominee is the eminently able Laurence Tribe, who has contended that the Constitution should be read as guaranteeing rights of affirmative governmental action in providing health care, housing, employment, and education. 33 Suppose also that a substantial bloc of Senators shares-as much of America evidently does-the "American vision" currently espoused by President Reagan, in particular his abhorrence of "big government." Could Professor Tribe say, under his test, that a filibuster against his nomination would be improper?
Even if a nominee passes through the "American vision" screen, another-the "overall balance" test A Senator should vote against a nomination if he conscientiously believes that it would "upset the Court's equilibrium or exacerbate what he views as an already excessive conservative or liberal bias." 5 "Balance" and "equilibrium" are, of course, squishy terms. Because Tribe answers a "resounding yes" to the question of whether the present Court reflects a "balance worth saving," s consider this plausible elaboration on the last hypothetical: The membership of the present Court remains unchanged until the departure in 1990 of Justice-Rehnquist, when President Cuomo nominates Professor Tribe to the Court. 37 Should the nomination be rejected because it would upset a "balance worth saving"? I doubt that, even speaking from the perspective of the Reagan years, Tribe would answer this question affirmatively. No, Tribe's concern is not with so elusive a concept as "balance." Rather, his goal is to ensure that, to the extent possible, the Court is composed of Justices who think the way he does. This becomes manifest when Tribe explains at length his rather surprising view that the balance on the present Court is worth saving. Time and again, he expresses fear that new Justices might "propel the Court over the cliff on which it is precariously perched" into the abyss of right-wing error;", at the same time, he obviously would welcome a far more liberal Court. 9 Although Tribe tends to assume that his readers agree with his views,
40
I suspect that he is in a distinct minority in many of the constitutional issues that he discusses. 41 And if Senators whose substantive views accord with Tribe's are to vote against a nominee likely to push the Court in a direction they do not want, Senators of opposing views-who might think the Court already leans too far to the left-would be entitled to follow the same practice. The result would be that any Senator would vote against any nominee whose views he disliked, or at least any nominee whose views he disliked very much. If Tribe is in the minority, as I suspect, then over the long run his standard would tend to work against the implementation of his views more often than in favor of them; indeed, few of us can [and] unenthusiastic in defense of rights of free expression where the poor and discontented are concerned").
have confidence that over the long run our views on controversial questions will prevail substantially more often than not in open political battle. In general, ideological opposition of the sort that Tribe proposes would politicize the selection process more than it would shift the Court either to the left or right.
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Before accepting such a political free-for-all, a careful analysis of its costs and benefits is appropriate. The benefit of rejecting a Supreme Court nominee on ideological grounds is obvious: It keeps off the Supreme Court a nominee who might cast votes that the Senate believes would be unacceptable and even dangerous. For several reasons, I believe this benefit is less significant and less certain than might appear. Part II of this essay reviews the historical record to present some of these considerations. Part III continues discussion of the benefit side of the ledger and also contends that Tribe underestimates the costs of ideological opposition to Supreme Court nominations. Finally, Part III offers a test, far more restrained than Tribe's, that I believe gives proper weight to both the costs and benefits of such opposition.
II. HISTORY
Section A of this part demonstrates that the ideological stance of a Justice, particularly over the long run, is often difficult to predict at the time of his nomination. Section B shows that, in large part because of limitations on the power of any President to shape the Court in his own image, ideological review is rarely necessary to prevent the Court from becoming extremist. Section C contends that, as judged with the perspective of historical hindsight, ideological review has not on balance improved the ideological make-up of the Court significantly, if at all; nor is it likely that more intense ideological review would have caused any substantial improvement of this nature.
A. Surprised Presidents and Senators
No matter how important a Justice's substantive views may be, ideological consideration at the time of his nomination is futile to the extent that it is impossible to predict what those views will be over the course of his career on the Court. A Justice's ideological performance, of course, is not as unpredictable as the flip of a coin; Franklin Roosevelt was not simply 42. Not surprisingly, both liberal and conservative Senators have taken the view, when the nominee has been to their liking, that ideological opposition is inappropriate, but have not consistently adhered to that view when they have disliked the nominee. Friedman, supra note 23, at 90; see also Powe, Book Review, 54 Tx. L. REv. 891, 892 (1976) (Senator Philip Hart "abandoned his position held at the Fortas hearings when the realization hit him and the other liberals that Republican presidents are also allowed Supreme Court appointments.").
lucky that all his nominees looked benignly on the exercise of governmental power to address economic problems, and one would have been justified in betting heavily that William Rehnquist would take an ideological position on the Court to the right of Thurgood Marshall. Most Justices fit at least very roughly the expectations that Presidents and Senators have at the time of nomination. But in this Section I will show that there have been a substantial number of surprises, enough so that a Senator considering opposition should take into account the real possibility that his ideological prediction will prove to be unduly pessimistic.
Tribe does not agree and takes up cudgels against what he calls "the myth of the surprised President." Although "rude surprises have occurred," he says, "they are few;" ' 43 " [f] or the most part, and especially in areas of particular and known concern to a President, Justices Tribal Myths Tribe's conclusion: As he acknowledges elsewhere, 4 9 issues that are not given much consideration at the time a Justice is nominated often turn out to matter most over the course of a career on the Bench. A Justice is likely to sit on the Court long after the issues that raged at the time of his nomination have faded; 50 indeed, the issues that are uppermost in the minds of the President and the public at the time of the nomination might be only a small part of the Court's work even during the years immediately following. 5 1 We all know that pigeonholes like "Federalist," "liberal," and "conservative" are very misleading, covering a multitude of differences and confusing a nominee's judicial and political views. But in predicting a nominee's long-term judicial outlook, beyond the issues already of concern, one often cannot reasonably hope to do much more than place him in some such broad category. 52. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
C. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE TANEY
PERIOD: 1836c64, at 47 (1974) (Volume V of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise).
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been selected more abundantly able to wear the ermine which Chief Justice Marshall honored;"" that Harlan Fiske Stone, a rather conservative Attorney General under Calvin Coolidge whose appointment to the Court was urged by William Howard Taft, moved so dramatically in the liberal direction that the great fighting progressive George Norris came to regret his leading role in opposing confirmation; 55 that several progressive Senators "quietly expressed regrets" for their opposition to the nomination as Chief Justice of Charles Evans Hughes, who proved to be far more moderate than they had expected, and in some areas decidedly liberal;" 8 that at least two of Franklin Roosevelt's appointees, Stanley Reed and Felix Frankfurter, proved to be far more conservative than might have appeared when they were nominated; 57 that Byron R. White, the only appointee of John F. Kennedy to serve an extended term on the Court, has on the whole been mildly conservative; or that in some respects Harry A. Blackmun, a Nixon appointee, has proven surprisingly liberal.
8
But even within his own focus on Presidents' surprise as to issues of known and particular concern to them, Tribe treats evidence unfavorable to his thesis rather cavalierly, sometimes belittling it, sometimes mischaracterizing it, and sometimes ignoring it. 59 The early Republicans. As Tribe acknowledges, Joseph Story, appointed by the Democratic-Republican James Madison, "proved to be an 58. Tribe does assert that "Justice Blackmun has been quite liberal on racial issues coming before the Court and has been a key figure in the Court's development of pro-choice principles in the abortion area." P. 35. But Tribe makes this point in another context, in which he is discussing not the surprise issue but the question of what effect rejecting one nominee might have; Tribe's point is that Blackmun has proved to have more acceptable views than Nixon's prior nominee for the seat, G. Harrold Carswell. Interestingly, Tribe does not compare Blackmun to Nixon's first nominee for the seat, Clement F. Haynsworth, whom Tribe later describes as "a judge of some distinction. . . whose integrity may . . . have been unfairly denigrated." P. 82.
59. See also, in addition to the discussion below, supra note 51 ("law and order" orientation of Burger Court has been less than was anticipated). even more committed Federalist than Chief Justice Marshall." But, Tribe explains, Madison "had only himself to blame," for he had been warned by members of his party, and especially by Thomas Jefferson, that Story had Federalistic tendencies. 60 This explanation is far too glib. It is true that Story had already given some evidence of such tendencies, 61 although Jefferson seems to have based his judgment primarily on the ambiguous stand that Story, largely in response to constituency pressure, took on the Embargo Laws. 6 2 But Madison, who was resolved to appoint a Republican," 3 did not act incomprehensibly in choosing Story. The nominee had been a Republican member of Congress and Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and his nomination was received with contempt by most of the Federalists of his state, who regarded him as a distasteful partisan. 4 Nor, it appears, was Madison alone in his assessment; although there may have been little enthusiasm for Story in the Senate-which was "completely controlled" by the Republicans yet had overwhelmingly rejected Madison's prior appointment of Alexander Wolcott 6 -the nomination was confirmed, apparently without difficulty, in three days. 6 So score one for Jefferson the Kibitzer. But when the Sage himself was on the firing line rather than the sideline, his aim was not so sure. Certainly he was highly motivated to pick Justices who shared his point of view. And yet, as Tribe acknowledges, Jefferson's three appointees-as well as Madison's two and the one chosen by the third Republican President, James Monroe-"over a thirty-year period. . . filed not one dissent to the key Federalist rulings of the Marshall Court. 6 1 7 Tribe's explanation, that the six "were either mesmerized or overwhelmed by Chief Justice Marshall," 6 8 not only ignores the conclusion of the most thorough study of the early Marshall Court, 6 9 but also hobbles his own thesis: If James offers a comprehensive discussion of the "seasoned controversy" between the two chief contenders, North Carolina and South Carolina, and supports the latter's claim. Id limited extent, and Tribe presents the evidence in a rather tilted way. 78 Most striking is his treatment of the celebrated episode concerning the Legal Tender Acts, the fiscal keystone of Lincoln's Administration. Tribe acknowledges that two of Lincoln's nominees joined the 4-3 majority invalidating the Acts in Hepburn v. Griswold, but he uses the litigator's ploy of emphasizing the best face of bad evidence: "[T]he three dissenting Justices were all Lincoln appointees-only two of his five appointees voted to invalidate the Legal Tender Acts." 7 8 The technique should not distract us; surely the big story is not that three Lincoln appointees supported this key legislation but that two did not. And the even bigger story is that one of the two was Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, who as Lincoln's Secretary of the Treasury had helped draft the Acts. Tribe mentions that fact, 7 9 but he does not acknowledge the irony that Chase was chosen in large part because of his presumed reliability on the legal tender issue. 80 Lincoln explained the nomination by commenting that we wish for a Chief Justice who will sustain what has been done in regard to emancipation and the legal tenders. We cannot ask a man what he will do, and if we should, and he should answer us, we should despise him for it. Therefore we must take a man whose opinions are known."' Whether Chase's turnabout was a genuine act of moral courage or, as was generally perceived at the time, simply a maneuver in his attempt to gain the Democratic Presidential nomination, 82 is an interesting question. Nor does Tribe discuss Roosevelt's second appointee, William R. Day, whose "position in [the Court's] ideological lineup remained equivocal" throughout nearly two decades on the Court "because of the curiously ambivalent legal philosophy which he brought with him to the bench." ' 93 In particular, although in other contexts Tribe emphasizes Hammer v.
76.
Dagenhart 94 as a particularly notorious 5-4 decision, 9 5 he does not point out that this Roosevelt appointee authored the majority opinion, which took a highly un-Rooseveltian view of the federal power over interstate commerce. Nor does he mention The Employers' Liability Cases, 98 another case in which Day provided the swing vote, this time to invalidate an important enactment 97 signed by Roosevelt himself. 8 Harry Truman. In one of the most celebrated cases in American history, two of Harry Truman's four appointees joined the majority holding that Truman's seizure of the nation's steel mills was unconstitutional. 9 Tribe dismisses this incident, because in his view the steel crisis was "wholly unpredictable" at the time of the appointments, raising an "as yet unforeseen issue." ' For several reasons, this attempted demurrer fails. For one thing, even accepting as true Tribe's assertion that the monumental Steel Seizure issue was unforeseeable at the time of the nominations, it gives away too much of his case. That is, the unforeseeability argument reemphasizes a crucial factor limiting the importance of a President's ability to predict how his nominees will stand on issues already apparent: Over the long run, the issues not apparent at the time of nomination will likely prove to be equally, if not more, significant.
Second, Tribe's premise, that the basic issue in the Steel Seizure case was unforeseeable when Truman made his nominations, is false. As Justice Frankfurter's well-known concurrence demonstrates, there had been numerous Presidential seizures of industrial plants and facilities throughout history, including at least three in the 1940's under circumstances comparable to those of the steel seizure. 1 02 And certainly the broader question of the breadth of nonstatutory Presidential powers was a live one. 1 " To suggest that in making his nominations Truman considered other issues to the exclusion of this one ignores both the legal context of the time and the nature of Harry Truman.
Finally, even assuming the truth of Tribe's other unsupported proposition-that the three issues he lists were the only ones considered by Truman in making his nominations-the conclusion that Truman "got what he wanted" is overstated. Tribe lists eight decisions in which Truman appointees voted on the side of civil rights for blacks. 104 He does not mention that, in all eight, all the non-Truman appointees also voted on that side of that case; all eight were unanimous decisions. Nor does he mention that in Morgan v. Virginia, ' 1 5 the first important civil rights decision of Truman's term, Justice Burton-the only Truman appointee already on the Bench-was the only dissenter from the Court's holding that Virginia's "Jim Crow" law was unconstitutional as applied to buses moving in interstate commerce. And in pointing to the participation in Brown v. In sum, even on issues of known and particular concern at the time of nomination, surprises are not rare. On other issues, one cannot reasonably hope to do more than draw a very wide circle within which the new Justice is expected to fit, and even that prediction cannot be made with great confidence.
Just as issues change, so do Justices. Sometimes, as in the case of Harlan Stone, this seems to be largely because the Court exposes a Justice to a new set of influences; 1 " 9 sometimes, as was probably true in the case of Earl Warren, it may be because the Court protects a Justice from an old set of pressures; 1 0 sometimes, as Tribe acknowledges, change is the natural and desirable product of time and growth. 1 1 Moreover, it is often difficult to ascertain fully what a nominee's attitudes truly are even at the time of nomination. A good illustration of this is the Hughes nomination of 1930. As visible a public figure as Hughes had been, his corporate law practice led many progressives to assume that he would be a reactionary Chief Justice. A lesson wisely drawn from the episode is that the place to 107. P. 69. 
R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
B. A President's Impact
In contending that "a President with any skill and a little luck . . . can, with fair success, build the Court of his dreams," 1 "" Tribe overreaches mightily. Of course, the strawman with which Tribe does battle-that "Presidents cannot influence the Supreme Court through careful appointments" 1 1 5 -is equally overdrawn. A more accurate assessment is that a President can usually move the Court somewhat in the direction he wants, with the extent and consistency of that movement depending in large part on the President's luck; usually the movement is incremental, and a single President can almost never make the Court extreme. We do not need ideological review of Supreme Court nominations by the Senate as a backstop to prevent the Court from veering off in a dangerous direction.
Naturally, a President's ability to affect the Court increases with the number of appointments he makes, but to get its way any number of Justices less than a majority must still persuade other colleagues. Tribe errs, or at least stretches, in saying that "[i]t is far from uncommon for . . . a majority of the Court to be the result of a single President's nominations." ' 8 Since 1869, when the number of seats on the Court was last set
Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (1941).
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See infra text accompanying note 181. Part of the problen is that many nominees refuse to discuss questions of judicial philosophy or constitutional law at their confirmation hearings, often assertedly out of fear that such statements either would appear improper or might later require recusal. Tribe recognizes the dangers of too particular an inquiry, and endorses Justice O'Connor's refusal to predict how she would vote in future abortion cases. P. 101. And yet Tribe recommends that the Senate make an extremely detailed inquiry into a nominee's views on some important issues of the day, such as abortion. See pp. 98-100. One problem with a "too-deep probing" into the nominee's views on specific issues is that it "might be understood as seeking assurance of particular results in individual cases, [which] is clearly an improper interference with the judicial function." McKay, Selection of United States Supreme Court Justices, 9 U. KAN. L. REV. 109, 131 (1960). On the other hand, if the Senate contents itself with the broader species of questioning suggested by Tribe, such as, "Does the nominee believe that the increasing complexity and danger of our world require giving the President more discretionary power?", p. 104, it is unlikely that the questioning will derive very much that is useful for decisionmaking. Interestingly, even during the Reagan Administration some liberal Senators have opposed the idea that the Senate should delve too deeply into the ideology of judicial nominees. See Kerry, On PrejudicingJustice, 81 HARV. L. REC. 13 (Oct. 18, 1985) . Evidently, these Senators fear that pressure from the ideological right is more likely to affect the Administration's nominating policy than is pressure from Democrats. See also Mikva, supra note 81, at 40 (arguing that, although it is appropriate for Senators to seek judges who in long run will do what Senators believe is best, Senate must exercise great restraint in questioning nominees on ideological matters Second, it is unlikely that a one-President majority on the Court will consistently pull together in the same direction, and especially unlikely that it will do so to an extreme degree. This is attributable partly to the consideration discussed in Section A, that some Justices tend to go off in unanticipated directions, partly to the relatively slight emphasis placed on ideology by some Presidents in selecting Justices, 2 0 and partly to the relatively moderate ideology of most Presidents. Thus, the period of Eisenhower majority on the Court, far from being one of stodgy conservatism, coincided roughly with the blossoming of the Warren Court. The Roosevelt Court, of course, was solid in support of expanding state and federal economic power. Even on this issue, however, the change was accomplished mainly by Justices appointed by previous Presidents,' and as the constitutional front moved to new ground, the Court became both personally and substantively fractious. ' The last five Roosevelt Justices-Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Jackson-did not constitute in the aggregate either a united or an extreme phalanx. The case of the Taft appointees is somewhat less familiar. Perhaps that is why Tribe misstates it so badly:
Although he was not as dogmatic in his conservatism as the late nineteenth-century Presidents, Taft was determined to avoid nominees of the liberal stamp of Learned Hand, Louis Brandeis, or Benjamin Cardozo. Taft regarded these potential candidates as nothing less than "destroyers of the Constitution." Taft's selections buttressed the appointments of Presidents Harrison and Cleveland and ensured that the Court would remain insensitive and even hostile to the interests of working people and reformers throughout the first third of the twentieth century. First, let's clear away some underbrush. Taft loathed Brandeis's views, but it is absurd to think that, with any Republican President and Senate of the time, the radical Boston lawyer could have been a "potential candidate." As for Hand and Cardozo, both were in their thirties when Taft became President, and neither was then a potential candidate for the Supreme Court; in fact, far from displaying hostility to Hand, Taft appointed the young lawyer to a District Court seat. True, Taft as Chief Justice counseled Warren Harding against nominating Hand and expressed reluctance concerning Cardozo. That was more than a decade later, however, when Taft was a different and much more ideologically rigid man, 12 5 and even then he expressed great. respect for Cardozo.
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Tribe greatly distorts Taft's role as Chief Justice in filling the Court. But this should not be distracting. The story on which to focus concerns the Supreme Court appointments that Taft made when he was in the White House.
Tribe's conclusory declaration notwithstanding, Taft was "relatively little intent on a candidate's precise ideological orientation," 12 and in the aggregate his appointees moved the 'Court noticeably to the left. In 1909 he appointed Horace Lurton, whom Theodore Roosevelt had nearly nominated three years earlier. It was principally fear of partisan resistance that had dissuaded Roosevelt, 1 2 who in a letter to Lodge described Lurton in glowing terms:
He is right on the negro question; he is right on the power of the Federal Government; he is right on the insular business; he is right about corporations; and he is right about labor. 1 30 Plainly, no one perceived as a hardline conservative could earn such praise from TR."' Taft's second appointee, in 1910, was Charles Evans Hughes, the fighting Governor of New York, who was one of the leading progressive politicians of the day. 3 In December 1910, Taft received an almost universally enthusiastic reaction""' by promoting Edward D. White, who had been an able and moderate Associate Justice, 1 33 to the center seat. At the same time he added to the Court Joseph R. Lamar and Willis Van Devanter. The response to these nominations was more muted because neither man was well-known, but generally favorable because, to most observers, neither man appeared particularly likely to buttress the forces of reaction. 136 On the same day, Taft made five nominations to the newly created Commerce Court and two to the Interstate Commerce Commission. "At a minimum," Professor Bickel has aptly written, "the general tone of opinion about the appointments as a whole may be characterized by the comment of the Kansas City Times, a Progressive newspaper: 'Some are obviously admirable; none is obviously wrong.' "137 As for Taft Tribe concentrates several errors into this brief passage: (1) At the time of his nomination in 1912, Pitney did not appear to have a "rigidly conservative political philosophy." He had, in fact, "dis- . And yet there were some opinions at this stage of Lamar's career-as there were not to be in his few years as a Justice-that are barely identifiable as mildly progressive in tone and direction. Van Devanter, before coming to the Supreme Court, was almost exclusively a politician and technician, a sound and brilliant lawyer, with a flat and sensible style; only in the 1920's and 1930's did his ideological commitment emerge. See id. at 49-52, 326.
Id. at 61 (footnote omitted).
Pp. 82-83.
played a generally hospitable attitude" toward "the few measures of social and economic regulation" that had come before him as a high New Jersey judge." 3 One important decision, George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Blowers' Association,"' o betrayed Pitney's hardnosed attitude toward unions, but that case stood out by itself in Pitney's record. "No wonder Taft could see nothing objectionable in [that record], and probably no cause to fear that anyone else would find it objectionable.""'
(2) The opposition to Pitney was not based on his perceived lack of ability. In fact, Pitney was regarded nearly universally as an eminent judge."" Rather, the opposition was based almost totally on the Jonas case."" But the unions and progressive Senators failed to unite in protest against the nomination; indeed, William Borah of Idaho led the forces in its favor, and most progressive newspapers supported it. Thus, Pitney was confirmed in 23 days."" (3) Although Pitney was far from a giant, he was a respectable judge and-putting ideology aside-a good one.
14 Far from belittling Pitney, Taft as Chief Justice manifested respect for him." 4 True, in 1922 Taft-in a letter to his brother, not publicly-described Pitney as a "weak member" of the Court. But that was after Pitney had suffered a breakdown in his health, including the beginnings of the arterial degeneration that soon after brought on a massive stroke and eventually killed him. In the same letter, Taft also described as weak-all on grounds of age or health-Justices McKenna, Day and, yes, Holmes.
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Taft's nominees, in short, ranged from moderately conservative to decidedly progressive, from capable to outstanding. The net effect was not to rigidify the Court but to move it noticeably in the progressive direction. Indeed, the Taft nominations ushered in a brief period in which the Court as a whole appeared to be mildly progressive-not consistently or extremely so, to be sure, but markedly so in comparison to the Court of a few years before or a few years after.
148
The Taft nominations thus fit easily in the general pattern. An individual President can nudge the Court, and even achieve dramatic short-term results, but it is difficult for him to fashion the Court in his image over the long-term and nearly impossible for him to make the Court extreme. Of course, the nominations of two or more successive Presidents may move the Court in the same direction; as Tribe points out, "even Supreme Courts whose composition is the work of several presidential hands can be remarkably uniform in outlook . . . . Supreme Courts of varied origin have given us decisions that are remarkably monolithic." 4 9 But if such a monolith is erected over decades, and is the product of different Presidents elected in different eras, it is generally difficult to characterize as extreme. 1 50 And even if we believe the extremist label sometimes does fit the Court, we must still ask the question to which we now turn: Would things really turn out any better if the Senate took a more active ideological role?
C. The Senate's Impact
Another of the "myths" that Tribe contests is that of "the spineless Senate"-"that the Senate has historically treated Supreme Court nominations much like a President's choice of Attorhey General or even of Postmaster General, usually deferring and giving the Chief Executive the 'man he wants.' """ Again, Tribe does battle with straw; if anyone really 
P. 109.
150. Indeed, the "remarkably uniform" outlooks of various Presidents' appointees tends to undercut Tribe's contention that a President can have confidence that his appointees will support his outlook.
Significantly, although the present Court is dominated by the presence of four nominees of Richard Nixon and one of Ronald Reagan, Tribe does not regard it as extreme. On the contrary, he contends that "there is much to applaud in its jurisprudence" and answers a "resounding yes" to the question of whether it reflects a "balance . . . worth saving." P. 111.
151. P. 78.
Tribal Myths believes in this myth, a glance at the back of Charles Warren's classic history of the Supreme Court 52 should be sufficient to show that at times the Senate has been downright ornery. Nor would one have to delve very deep into Warren to confirm that Senatorial opposition has often been based on what Tribe calls the "political, judicial, and economic philosophies" of the nominees. 1 5 The more difficult questions are whether, viewed from the historical perspective, such ideological review has done substantial good, and whether more of it would have been a good thing. Determining whether a political act has worked for well or ill is, of course, a highly subjective matter, unless we are looking back across a sufficient historical distance to yield a measure of consensus. Consider therefore the half century or so ending in 1937. This is a crucial test era, for there now seems to be universal agreement that the Court then performed poorly in many respects, its decisions hindering more often .than fostering social progress. But certainly-putting aside for the moment the 1930's-the Senate did not use its power over Court nominees to alter that situation. And if the Senate had been more aggressive, it almost certainly would have made the Court less, rather than more, progressive.
For example, Tribe makes much of the conservative appointments of Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland.'M But he does not suggest that, had the Senate played a greater role in selecting the Justices during this period, the complexion of the Court would have changed. Nor could he, for the Senate of the late nineteenth century was a conservative body, the least popular institution in government, because it appeared to be the most powerful and insistent in thwarting the public will. 1 
55
Nor did that situation change dramatically with the new century; Theodore Roosevelt needed all his extraordinary resourcefulness to achieve his remarkable legislative record over the resistance of an often hostile Congress dominated in both houses by the Old Guard. 5 In 1906 TR nominated William H. Moody in the face of warnings that Moody's strenuous progressivism would raise objections in the Senate. The opposition soon collapsed, notwithstanding a notable lack of enthusiasm for Moody in the Senate, because in that era Senators were not disposed to struggle with Presidents over the personnel of the Court. The Brandeis affair simply cannot be "distinguished away" from modern concerns because it involved anti-Semitism, which presumably is now unlikely to reappear with such virulence in a confirmation battle. Although much was made of Brandeis's Jewishness, it played a subsidiary role in the dispute, 6 0 primarily to emphasize in the minds of some opponents 16 ' that Brandeis was an outsider-"not a fit person to be a member of the Supreme Court"' 63 because he did not adhere to the unwritten code of the legal establishment.' At base, the episode was ideological, "a fight for the soul of the Supreme Court."" And for our present purpose, two facts stand out. First, in that struggle it was the nominee, not his Senate opponents, who represented the progressive forces in society and the prospect of a Court more attuned to the public will.' 6 5 Second, had the President not applied his full political weight, the opposition might have pre- Medina, supra note 175, at 303 (Justice Stone's "point of view was strikingly similar to that of Judge Parker, both on the subject of the power to deal with economic threats and the power of the courts to safeguard the rights of individuals vis-a-vis the government"); id. at 306 ("a massive record of sound supports the generally held view that his rejection was a grievous error.7 Apart from offering the conclusory and evidently inaccurate declaration that "Justice Roberts was, of course, less wedded to the wisdom of the past," ' Tribe does nothing to dispel this view.
The 1930 confirmation episodes highlight the fact that, in attempting to judge what a nominee's views will likely be on the Supreme Court, the Senate will often err; indeed, the progressives in 1930 batted oh-for-three, placing Hughes and Parker too far to the right and Roberts too far to the left. 181 By now, this should not be surprising. In trying to assess and predict the outlook of a nominee, the Senate is burdened with all the same problems that face a President, and potentially more: The Senate is less likely than the President and his advisers to know the nominee intimately, less able to consider the nominee's record reflectively, and more subject to interest group pressures that may magnify stray events and nominees', past statements beyond their real significance.
III. SUMMING UP THE LEDGER
Part II has reviewed the historical record to show that the benefits of ideological opposition to Supreme Court nominees are less than may appear. This part will examine other, less historically oriented considera-almost inconceivable to me that they could do any better. Ronald Reagan isn't going to appoint liberal Democrats." 18 1 7 The lone wolfs limited bite. A single Justice, no matter how extreme, cannot make the Court itself extremist. Of course, as I have already acknowledged, a single Justice can have an important impact on the nation; 88 to demonstrate this point convincingly requires little more than the recitation of a long series of 5-4 decisions dating back to the mid-19th century. 9 But Tribe carries his argument further, pointing out that "one Justice can often make much more than one vote's difference." A Justice can do this, Tribe argues, principally by acting as a catalyst, leading the Court to "new frontiers of constitutional law" through the use of what Tribe aptly calls "persuasive judicial skills." 1 90 That is certainly true enough, but Tribe's phrase suggests its own crucial limitations: For the most part, a single Justice can exert power transcending his vote only by persuading other Justices,"' and his views can prevail only if at least half of the Court agrees with him. The vote of an extremist Justice counts no more than those of his more moderate colleagues-and no more than would the vote of a second-choice appointee of the same President.
True, a Justice may affect the law crucially even without persuading his own colleagues, by writing a persuasive dissent or concurrence that successfully "appeal[s] to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day." ' 1 92 But this impact will occur only if the opinion has persuasive power and, in general, only if it persuades the majority of a latter-day Court.
No one denies that a single Justice, any Justice, can have enormous impact on the nation; it is highly unlikely, however, that a single extremist Justice will have an extreme impact.
Balance over the long run. Over the long run, Senatorial opposition is unlikely to move the Court much in one direction or the other, for the Senate may be to the right of the President about as often as it is to the 187. Udall, A Master Stroke, Wash. Post, July 13, 1981, at A13, col. 2. 188. See supra text accompanying note 23; p. 31. Tribe contests, p. 31, the comments by Justice Rehnquist, supra note 9, at 24, that "Supreme Court appointments almost invariably come 'one at a time,'" and that the Court is "far more dominated by centrifugal forces, pushing towards individuality and independence, than it is by centripetal forces pulling for hierarchical ordering and institutional unity." Unlike Tribe, I do not believe that Justice Rehnquist meant by these points to "deny. . . the idea that one or two Justices can make a major difference at the Court." P. 31. But they do support the view that, while a single Justice may have a major impact, he cannot singlehandedly make the Court extreme.
189 left.' 9 3 Indeed, a Senator deciding whether to reject a nominee whose substantive views he finds distasteful might well take into account the possibility that, as viewed from the perspective of later years, he would find the nominee's views to be correct, or at least more acceptable.", It is not a bad thing to exercise some humility in dealing with difficult issues of long-term significance.'
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B. The Cost Side
The considerations discussed in Part II and in Section A of this Part limit the benefit of ideological opposition, but they do not by themselves demonstrate that the Senate should refrain from such opposition. However difficult prediction is, the Senate can probably do it better by exercising its considered judgment than, say, by flipping a coin. And it is an essential part of our constitutional structure that the Senate exercise that judgment rather than rubber stamp decisions made by the President.
Thus, if there were no costs to ideological resistance, I would still regard it as worthwhile for whatever value it might have. In some contexts, however, it is appropriate for one branch to defer to the choices of another, at least within broad bounds, because refusal to defer carries potential costs.' 9 6 And active ideological opposition to Supreme Court nominations does not come cost-free.
One cost of rejecting a Supreme Court nominee is obvious: For a time, the Court is not at full strength. Accordingly, it may hesitate to decide its most controversial cases, and in some cases fewer than five votes will determine the disposition. That cost is usually acceptable, but it may become less so if the Senate digs in its heels and repeatedly blocks the President's attempts to fill a vacancy-a possibility that is much greater when opposition is based on ideology rather than on competence or temperament. And this cost of ideological resistance may become least tolerable precisely when the apparent benefit is greatest-when several vacancies give a single President an opportunity to change the complexion of the Court very 193. Moreover, ideological opposition from one side of the political spectrum is likely to help generate similar opposition in later cases from the other side. Cf. McConnell, supra note 184, at 9 (Senate considered Haynsworth nomination in light of "recent precedent for senatorial questioning" set by Senate's consideration of nomination of Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice).
194. Cf p. 58 ("It is a sobering postscript ... that Jackson's jihad against the Bank of the United States had a very real and genuinely ironic impact on the farmers, laborers and common people for whom he took up the sword ... [because it played] a large part in triggering the devastating economic depression of 1837.").
195. See p. 103 (quoting Oliver Cromwell's plea, "Brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, bethink you that you may be mistaken.").
196. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 191, 202-03 (Court's responsibility at times to defer to other branches).
able than the other branches to render unpopular decisions, and thus to perform what may be its most important constitutional role-protecting the rights of individuals and the politically weak." 1 On the other side is the passive aspect: Because the Court is not chosen democratically, it must not insert its judgment on matters of policy in place of that of the political branches. Thus, a Justice properly performing his function cannot give force to those policy views without restraint. Tribe recognizes this: "That there is much a judge could not properly do in the [Constitution's] name is true enough." 2 0 ' 2 And in another context he points out that "sometimes the Court best guarantees our rights by deferring to, rather than overruling, the political branches." 20 3 That, indeed, is the chief lesson of the crisis that culminated in 1937. Acknowledging that a judge's philosophical and political beliefs profoundly influence his decisions does not require us to regard him as an ordinary high political officer. Both aspects of this distinction are crucial; if the distinction between the judiciary and the political branches blurs, so will the role of the Court. And if the Senate treats a Supreme Court nomination as an ordinary political matter, albeit one of great national significance, the distinction is sure to blur.
C. An Alternative Standard
The foregoing analysis suggests to me that, in general, the long-run benefit of ideological opposition is too uncertain and too limited to be worth the very substantial costs that it entails. But a Senator should not put ideological considerations totally out of mind. He should satisfy himself that the nominee does not hold views that the Senator regards as so repugnant that he perceives harm merely in giving the nominee the opportunity to air them from the platform of the Supreme Court. If the nominee falls to meet this test, then I believe the balance of costs and benefits swings the other way and the Senator should vote against confirmation.
This standard takes into account the educational function that is a by-201. See Mikva, supra note 81, at 39 ("The line we are concerned about in judicial selection is between a judge who constantly remembers who appointed him and a judge who remembers that popular decisions can be made easily by the popular branches of the government, but that his function is to protect minority rights from majority passions.").
202. P. 48 (emphasis in original). 203. P. 10. 204. See Mikva, supra note 81, at 40 ("When the Court is perceived as an apolitical, wise, and impartial tribunal, the American people have evinced a willingness to abide by its decisions. But if the Court is viewed simply as a Congress in black robes, the Court's ability to perform its constitutional function is threatened.").
product of the Court's decisions. All Supreme Court opinions, even lone dissents, have a measure of authority in the public eye by virtue of their high source. They thus lend legitimacy to the views they espouse. All beliefs are worthy of expression in our society, but some should not be expressed from one of the nine seats on the Supreme Court. One Justice holding such views can do significant harm even without the concurrence of other Justices.
Moreover, if the nominee has expressed such views already, it is not as likely as in the ordinary case that the Senate's assessment of the nominee's outlook is mistaken; nor is it likely that the nominee will have an ideological conversion once on the Bench. Unless the President himself is an equally fervent extremist, rejection of such a nomination is unlikely to create a deadlock. Furthermore, although individual Senators would naturally vary in their application of this standard, they need not fear that invoking it would later haunt them by inviting retaliation from the other side of the political fence; a Senator should be well satisfied if the standard is applied equally to extremists of the left or right. Such a nominee should be rejected without fear of harming the selection process or the Court itself.
But the category of beliefs covered by this standard is a narrow one, including only those that a Senator considers beyond the realm of rational political discourse in the nation, not those-such as abortion-at the heart of the controversy. Surely a nominee holding such abhorrent views will rarely be named, and it must be rarer still that a nominee would fail this standard and yet satisfy the Senate with respect to his ability, temperament, and integrity. Those should be the principal criteria that the Senate uses in reviewing Supreme Court nominations.
I do not pretend that considerations of ideology are always clearly distinct from those of ability and temperament, or even from those of integrity. In some cases, a Senator who espouses the standard I suggest but who dislikes the nominee's views may be able to say, "Anybody who takes that position clearly doesn't understand the Constitution," or "If that's her attitude toward precedent, she doesn't have the judicial temperament that the Court needs." But the prospect of some slippage in applying my standard does not render the standard invalid; although there is no way to eliminate ideology from the review of Supreme Court nominations, a Senator adhering conscientiously to an austere attitude can narrowly confine its role.
If the Senate follows this approach, it will of course occasionally abandon the opportunity to prevent a decision or line of decisions that it deems unfavorable. Such self-restraint demands of the Senate a sense of constitutional courage: It must recognize that some choices in our government are meant to be the province of other branches; it must have faith that improper choices can eventually be corrected by the constitutional processes; and it must believe that assuring desired judicial results is less important than preserving the structural integrity of our government.
